Jaquette D. Logic and How it Gets That Way

Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014. — 321 p.In this challenging and provocative analysis, Dale Jacquette argues that contemporary philosophy labours under a number of historically inherited delusions about the nature of logic and the philosophical significance of certain formal properties of specific types of logical constructions. Exposing some of the key misconceptions about formal symbolic logic and its relation to thought, language and the world, Jacquette clears the ground of some very well-entrenched philosophical doctrines about the nature of logic, including some of the most fundamental seldom-questioned parts of elementary prop.Introduction: Logic, philosophy, analysisLogical form
Concepts of logic
Logical units and reasoning chains
Deductively valid inference forms
Pragmatic formalization rationale
Formal semantics and logical metatheoryMonkey raisins
An expressive limitation
Surprisingly problematic quantifications
Monkeys and raisins, craisins and kmonkeys
Implications of the paradox
Classical alternatives
Intensional solution to the expressibility problem
The monkey's taleThe secret life of truth- functions
Truth- functions
Cornerstone of extensional logic
Truth- tables for all and sundry
Truth- function mysteries
Constant truth- functions
Counter- examples to extensionalism
Objections anticipated
Expanding the counter- example family
Formal standards of (non- )truth- functionality
Extensionalism beyond reason and repairReference and identity
Identity relata
Cognitive significance of non-trivially true identity statements
Objections to Frege's identity thesis
Self- identity and designation
What's in a name?
Idea, sense and reference Linsky's critique of FregeIdentical sense and the extensional criterion
Intentionality of meaning
Semantics as a theory of the expression of thought
Reference's debt to identityIntensional versus extensional logic and semantics
Against the semantic grain
Referring and attributing properties to objects
Disguised definite descriptions
Problems in extensionalist reference models
Semantic oppositions idealized
Poverty of purely formal semantics
Davidson's T-schema
Purely formal semantics
Formalizing intentional meaning relations
Explanatory advantages of intensional semantics Slingshot argumentsTruth
What is truth?
Truth and meaning, meaning and truth
Constitutive versus regulative truth
Frege's theory of reified truth and falsehood
Tarski's analysis of truth-conditions in formal languages
Regulative alternative to constitutive truth concepts
Positive correspondence
Truth-makers, truth-breakers
Negative states of affairs
True and false sentences
Conceivability of a null universeLogical and semantic paradoxes
Why paradoxes matter
Philosophical legacy of inconsistency
Precarious logical integrityParadoxes of conditionals
Self-non-applications
Grelling's paradox contra type theory
Inductive paradoxes in a deductive logical framework
Conclusion: Moral lessons of logic
Notes